Topic
Moral agency and the empirical sciences

Scientific frame
More and more empirical scientists do not only do research on matters which until then predominantly were considered to belong to the domain of philosophy, but with the results of their research they also get involved with philosophical discussions. In addition, more and more philosophers themselves incorporate the results of empirical-scientific research into the formulations of their theories. Evolutionary biologists try to explain how the process of evolution could lead to the emergence of morality and they show that morality is to a much lesser degree an exclusively human phenomenon than usually is thought. To their mind, morality is not a product of culture but on the contrary, is connected with features and skills which are deeply rooted in our nature. Social-psychologists have tried to pull the rug out from under virtue ethics by concluding, based on various experiments, that concepts such as ‘character’ and ‘virtue’ are empirically untenable. More recent socio-psychological research has been done on moral judgements which shows that moral judgements often are intuitive, i.e. fast, automatic, unconscious, affection-charged reactions, in short ‘gut’ feelings. Reasons and reasoning rarely constitute moral judgements, but often are post hoc rationalisations of those judgements. Neuroscientists support that view by demonstrating that in cases of moral intuitions and moral reasoning different parts of the brains are active. Neuroscientists also try to get a grip on matters such as free will, weakness of will and amorality. As was mentioned, this generation of empirical scientists also gets involved with philosophical discussions. A widespread (but not generally) shared view among them is for instance that the Humean view of morality empirically is more adequate than the Kantian one and that the so-called ‘free will’ which ‘the’ philosophers talk about is an illusion. In order to evaluate these conclusions as philosophers and make a critical contribution to the broad discussions which at the moment are devoted to these empirical studies, we will also have to take a serious look at the results upon which they are based.
Philosophers cannot, nor ought to ignore the results of empirical research on moral agency. The formulation of ethical theories in future ought to be empirically well informed. But this does not imply that ethicists should resign themselves to the (philosophical) conclusions which empirical scientists draw. For the conceptual frames of empirical sciences are theory-charged, as well.

Aim
The course aims at 1) offering insight into the empirical presuppositions of philosophical and ethical theories to graduate students, 2) informing graduate students about relevant recent empirical-scientific research, and 3) asking graduate students to reflect on the consequences such research may have for philosophical and ethical concepts and theories.

Coordination
Prof.dr. A.W. Musschenga (VU University) and dr. M.M.S.K. Sie (EUR)

Structure
The course is split up into 10 sessions and takes place on 5 days spread out over three consecutive months. During the first session of a day relevant empirical research will be examined after which in the second session, the philosophical aspects will be considered and discussed.
The participants are expected to read all the assigned literature, to do assignments, to actively participate in the discussions and to write a paper at the end of the course.